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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 7' of the National Labor Relations Act 2 ("NLRA" or "Act") affords employees
the right to self-organization, that is, to form, join, or assist labor organizations. 3 The
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") and the courts in interpreting
this section have developed a somewhat Byzantine set of rules regulating the parameters
of union organizing efforts. 4 At the heart of these rules is the doctrine set forth by the
Supreme Court in the 1956 case of NLRB v. Babcock .9' Wilcox Co.5 Under this doctrine
a sharp differentiation is made between employee organizers, who are generally free to
organize at the workplace during nonworking hours, 6 and nonemployee/outside orga-
nizers who are generally barred from organizing at the work site.? Outside/nonemployee
organizers are prohibited under the Babcock doctrine from organizing at the workplace
so long as "reasonable efforts by the union through other available channels of com-
munication will enable it to reach the employees with its message." Unions bear a strong
burden of proof in establishing that such "available channels of communication" are not
available. 6
To help achieve a better "balance" of organizing rights between unions and em-
ployers, however, the NLRB has devised the critically important, yet frequently over-
looked, "home visits doctrine." Under this doctrine unions are allowed to campaign
and organize by visiting employees at their homes, while employers are not." The Board
has justified this disparity of treatment on the grounds that unions have fewer oppor-
tunities to address employees in other contexts. 12 Thus, in effect, unions are given the
L 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
2 29 U.S.C. 1§, 151-169 (1982).
3 Employer actions unreasonably interfering with such protected activities violate NLRA
§ 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(!).
4 See generally 1 C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 71-266, 309-40 (2d ed. 1983).
5 351 U.S. 105 (1956),
6 See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 805 (1945).
7 Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112-14.
Id. at 112.
See Note, NLRB Orders Granting Union Access to Company Property, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 895,
902 (1983); see also Sears Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Coon, of Carpenters, 436 U.S.
180, 205 (1978). The classic cases permitting worksite access to nonemployee organizers involve
situations where employees are both living and working at the job site, such as in the case of a
mining community or resort town. See, e.g., Alaska Barite Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 1023 (1972) (unpub-
lished per curiam decision), enforced, 83 L.R.R.M. 2992 (9th Cir. 1973); S & H Grossinger's, Inc.,
156 N.L.R.B. 233 (1965).
1 ° See infra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
" See Plant City Welding & Tank Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 131 (1957); Peoria Plastic Co., 117 N.L.R.B.
545 (1957).
2 See Plant City Welding, 119 N.L,R.B. at 133.
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right to visit employees at their homes as something of a tradeoff for not being able to
reach them easily at the workplace.
This article examines the prevailing organizational rights of unions and employers
and argues that the tradeoff envisioned by the Board in establishing the "home visits
doctrine" is not a fair one. More specifically, in today's social and economic environment,
the advantages employers gain by reaching employees at the workplace far outweigh
any concurrent union advantages in reaching employees at their homes. Moreover, even
if the "home visits doctrine" does meaningfully help "balance" union/management or-
ganizational rights, such balancing might come at too high a cost through concomitant
invasion of employee privacy which such visits entail. Consequently, this article will
recommend, in the context of a general reformulation of union organizational rights,
that the "home visits doctrine" be abolished and that neither employers nor unions be
permitted to campaign by visiting employees at their homes.
In this regard, Part II will sketch the contours of the current state of the law with
respect to employer/union access to employees at the workplace. This will be followed
in Part III by a discussion of the "home visits doctrine," and the key interrelationship
between this doctrine and the need for a more coherent model of union/management
organizational rights. Finally, Part IV will set forth specific guidelines regarding the
abolition of the "home visits doctrine" and the development of a new model for union
organizing. These guidelines will draw in part on various proposals in this regard raised
in Congress as part of the proposed Labor Reform Act of 1977, which was passed by
the House of Representatives, but successfully filibustered in the United States Senate.'
II. EMPLOYER/UNION ACCESS TO EMPLOYEES AT THE WORKPLACE
A. The Republic Aviation and Babcock Rules
The rules governing labor organizing at the workplace are fraught with an inherent
underlying conflict between the self-organizational rights of employees under section 7
of the NLRA and the right of employers as property owners and managers. Despite
section 8(a)(1)'s" prohibition against any "interference" with employee section 7 orga-
nizational rights, the NLRB and the courts have attempted to construct a careful balance
between these rights and the property rights of employers impaired by permitting union
organizing on their premises.
One of the key early cases in this regard is the United States Supreme Court's 1945
decision in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB.L 5 In this case the Court made a sharp
distinction between workplace organizing conducted during working time and that con-
ducted during nonworking time.I 6 The Court held that employer rules prohibiting union
solicitation or distribution of literature during working time are presumptively valid,
while such rules when applied to nonworking time are presumptively invalid.' 7
 While
over the years some twists and turns have been incorporated into the Republic Aviation
" See Comment, Labor Law Reform: The Regulation of Free Speech and Equal Access in NLRB
Representation Elections, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 755 & n.1 (1979) (listing the relevant pieces of
legislation) [hereinafter cited as Penn Commentl.
' 4 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
15 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
16 Id. at 801-05 & nn.8 & 10.
171d.
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doctrine, such as rules prohibiting the distribution of union literature in working areas
even during nonworking time" and those giving retail establishments special flexibility
in restricting all solicitation on the selling floor," the basic working time/nonworking
time distinction developed in that case has remained good law."
The Supreme Court in Republic Aviation did not, however, make any distinction
between employee organizers and nonemployee organizers," and the NLRB subse-
quently afforded both groups freedom to organize at the workplace during nonworking
hours.22 The Court, though, in its seminal decision eleven years later in NLRB v. Babcock
& Wilcox Co.," sharply reversed the Board on this issue."
In Babcock, the Supreme Court strongly differentiated between workplace organizing
by employees themselves, and workplace organizing by outside union organizers. 25 The
Court held that employers were free to deny workplace access to outside union organizers
as long as "reasonable efforts through other available channels of communication" would
enable the union to reach employees with its message. 26 The Court emphasized that in
Babcock forty percent of the company's 500 employees lived in a nearby town of 21,000,
and that employees were thus reasonably accessible to the union at their homes and
through other means aside from workplace organizing."
The basic core distinction between employee and nonemployee organizing set forth
in Babcock in 1956 still prevails. Absent unusual situations, such as mining communities
or resort hotels, where employees both live and work at the workplace and union access
to employees outside the workplace is virtually impossible, 28 employers have generally
been free to exclude outside union organizers from the workplace. Indeed, the courts
and the Board have tended to extend the basic principles of Babcock to off-duty em-
ployees, severely limiting the rights of these employees to organize on employer prem-
ises. 29 In any event, Babcock's holding that alternative methods for reaching employees
L8 See Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962).
L9 See, e.g., McDonald's Corp., 205 N.L.R.B. 404, 407-08 (1973); Goldblatt Bros., 77 N.L.R.B.
1262, 127! (1948); May Dep't Stores, 59 N.L.R.B. 976, 981 (1944) (dictum), enforced as modified, 154
F.2d 533 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 725 (1946).
29 See generally 1 C. MORRIS, supra note 4, at 88-89. See also G. BERENDT, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
176-77 (1984).
21 See Note, Still as Strangers: Non-employee Union Organizers on Private Commercial Property, 62
TEX, L. REV. 111, 117 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Texas Note].
22 Id. at 117-18. See also Hanley, Union Organization on Company Property — A Discussion of Property
Rights, 47 GEO. L.J. 266, 295 (1958); Note, Property Rights and Job Security: Workplace Solicitation by
Non-employee Organizers, 94 YALE L.J. 374, 378 n.24 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Yale Note].
29 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
24 Id. at 112-13.
"Id at 112-14.
16 1d. at 112.
27 1d. at 106-07.
28 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
2 ' See infra notes 285-94 and accompanying text. The basic thrust of Babcock is one of distinction
between invitees and trespassers with outside organizers falling into the latter category. Since off-
duty employees are no longer invitees, various courts have held them to be similarly situated. See
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 539, 547 (8th Cir. 1973); Diamond Shamrock Co. v.
NLRB, 443 F.2d 52, 58 (3d Cir. 1971). The NLRB has more or less supported this view, although
the Board's position has contained some ambiguities, and tended to require more of an employer
accommodation in terms of property rights with respect to off-duty employees. Compare Tri-County
Medical Center, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 1089 (1976), with GTE Lenkhurt, Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 921 (1973),
and Pioneer Fishing Corp., 247 N.L.R.B. 1299, 1303 (1980) (post-Tri-County case citing GTE).
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available to unions, such as home visits, obviating the need for union access to the
workplace, remains one of the most significant tenets of American labor law.
B. "Captive Audiences" and Nutone
The Republic Aviation and Babcock cases set forth the proposition that employers can
develop general rules prohibiting on-site solicitation by outside union organizers, and
any union solicitation during working time. These cases did not, however, address the
question of how these rights might be affected by an employer's decision to wage a
vigorous campaign against a union at the work-site during working time, This precise
question, though, has been the subject of considerable litigation before the Board and
the courts both prior to, and following, the Republic Aviation and Babcock decisions."
The issue which has captured the most attention in this regard has been the ability
of employers to give "captive audience" speeches, that is anti-union speeches delivered
at the workplace to massed groups of employees during working time. Various observers
have characterized such speeches as perhaps the most potent weapon in an employer's
anti-union arsenal." As Professor Howard Lesnick has noted, when an employer gathers
his employees together for a paid group meeting to deliver an anti-union speech, he is
implicitly telling them that he cares more about their position on unionization than about
their work."
For this and related reasons, the NLRB, during the early days of the Act, found
"captive audience" speeches to be inherently coercive and unfair labor practices. 33 Con-
gress's incorporation of a "free speech" provision, section 8(c), 34 as part of its 1947 Taft-
Hartley amendments to the Act, however, forced a reevaluation of the issue." As a result,
in the 1951 case of Bonwit Teller, Inc., 36 the NLRB held that employer "captive audience"
speeches were no longer per se unlawful." The Board in Bonwit Teller, however, put a
condition on an employer's decision to make such a speech, holding that an employer
who chooses to use his premises for such purposes must give the union the same
opportunity to present its case."
30 For an excellent historical review of the subject, see Bredhoff, Labor Law Reform: A Labor
Perspective, 20 B.C.L. REV. 27, 27-37 (1978). See also Kramer, Labor Law Reform: A Management
Perspective, 20 B.C.L. REV. 4,4- 13 (1978).
3 ' See, e.g., L. JACKSON & R. LEWIS, WINNING NLRB ELECTIONS. MANAGEMENT STRATEGY AND
PREVENTIVE PROGRAMS 119-20 (1972); Lewis, The Law and Strategy of Dealing with Union Organizing
Campaigns, 25 LAB. L.J. 42, 46 (1974). The special potency of speeches of this kind has been
confirmed in recent empirical studies. See, e.g., Dickens, The Effect of Company Campaigns on Certifi-
cation Elections: Law and Reality Once Again, 36 Nous. & LAB. REL. REV. 560, 570-71 (1983).
" See The Advocates: Should Congress Provide More Protection for Union Organizing? 17
(April 27, 1978) (transcript of television program), cited in Penn Comment, supra note 13, at 780
n.148.
°s
	 e.g., Clark Bros. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 802, 804-05 (1946), enforced, 163 F.2d 373 (2d Cir.
1947).
34 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982).
" For a comprehensive historical analysis of this provision and what led to its enactment see
Penn Comment, supra note 13, at 758-62.
36 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951).
37 id. at 614-15.
58 Id. at 612.
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Two years later, however, the Board, in a not atypical abrupt shift in policy occa-
sioned by the appointment of new members," reversed Bonwit Teller in Livingston Shirt
Corp..") In Livingston Shirt, the NLRB held that employers are free to give "captive
audience" speeches without affording unions an "equal opportunity" to do the same."
More specifically, the Board stated:
We do not believe that unions will be unduly hindered in their right to carry
on organizational activities by our refusal to open up to them the employer's
premises for group meetings, particularly since this is an area from which
they have traditionally been excluded, and there remains open to them all
the customary means for communicating with employees. These include
individual contact with employees on the employer's premises outside work-
ing hours ... at their homes, and at union meetings. These are time-honored
and traditional means by which unions have conducted their organizational
campaigns, and experience shows that they are fully adequate to accomplish
unionization and accord employees their rights under the Act to freely choose
a bargaining agent.42
It should be noted, however, that in its Livingston Shirt decision the NLRB provided
no specific details, documentation, or empirical evidence to support its claim that "ex-
perience" has shown that other avenues of communicating with employees are "fully
adequate" for unions to achieve their organizational goals.'$ Nevertheless, despite both
legislative" and litigative45
 attempts to overturn it, the Board's decision in Livingston Shirt
has remained good law. 46
Moreover, the general principle enunciated by the NLRB in Livingston Shirt was
upheld by the Supreme Court in the 1958, post-Babcock case of NLRB v. United Steelworkers
(Nutone).47 In Nutone, the Court held that an employer can lawfully enforce a workplace
no-solicitation rule against unions while at the same time "violating" this policy by
engaging in anti-union solicitation at times and places prohibited by the rule. 48 Citing
Babcock,19 the Supreme Court noted that under the NLRA unions have other available
avenues of communication, and that they are not "entitled to use a medium of com-
munication simply because the employer is using it."" Nevertheless, Justice Frankfurter,
writing for the Nutone Court, did state that employers were not free to implement no-
solicitation rules in this manner where a substantial "imbalance in the opportunities for
'9 For an interesting treatment of more recent NLRB reversals of policy, see Bierman, Reflections
on the Problem of Labor Board Instability, 62 DEN. U.L. REV. 551 (1985) (Labor Law Symposium).
40
 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
41 Id. at 409.
42 Id. at 406.
46
 See generally Bredhoff, supra note 30, at 30.
" See infra notes 181-200 and accompanying text.
4 " See infra notes 52-70 and accompanying text.
46 One significant caveat to the Livingston Shirt rule is the NLRB's ruling in Peerless Plywood
Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427,429 (1953), which holds that an election can be set aside under the Board's
"laboratory 'conditions" test if an employer makes a "captive audience" speech within twenty-four
hours prior to a representation election.
47 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
4a
	 at 358,364.
46 Id. at 363.
5° Id. at 364.
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organizational communication" existed." Thus, as in Babcock and Livingston Shirt, the
Court's decision in Nutone turned on the perceived ability of unions to communicate
effectively with employees in other manners, particularly those outside the workplace.
C. General Electric and Excelsior
The labor movement in 1966 brought a test case, General Electric Co., 52 in an attempt
to get the Kennedy-Johnson "New Frontier" Labor Boards to reverse the Eisenhower
Board's decision in Livingston Shirt holding that employers are free to give "captive
audience" speeches without affording unions any right of reply. The unions argued that
the Board, by allowing employers the right to campaign at the worksite while affording
unions no right of worksite reply, gave employers an unfair advantage in communicating
their side of the story.54 This, the unions asserted, interfered with the conduct of free
and fair labor representation elections. ,"
The Board, however, deflected resolution of the issues raised in Giteral Electric by
pointing to its decision on the same day in the companion case of Excelsior Underwear,
inc." In Excelsior, the Board held." that within seven days of the scheduling of a Board
representation election, employers must file with the Board a list containing the names
and addresses of all eligible voters, which will then be turned over to the unions involved.
Failure by employers to comply with this requirement will result in the Board setting
the given election aside pursuant to its "laboratory conditions" doctrine."
The Board based its decision in Excelsior on findings that, without access to complete
and accurate lists of employee names and addresses, unions were at a severe organizing
disadvantage.59 Indeed, unions had been placed in something of a "Catch-22" situation.
The Court and the Board told the unions in Babcock, Nut one, and Livingston Shirt not to
worry about access to employees at the workplace because they could reach employees
outside of work. But, without employee names and addresses, reaching employees out-
side of work was not exactly a simple task.
The Excelsior decision Was clearly designed to ameliorate this situation and, in par-
ticular, to afford unions the opportunity to reach employees at their homes. The Board
specifically cited the advantages employers have in reaching employees at the jobsite, 6°
and the difficulties unions face in sidewalk solicitation and distribution of literature.61
The Board also noted the difficulties unions face in having employee supporters engage
in personal solicitation at the workplace where such solicitation is limited to nonworking
5 ' Id. at 362.
52 156 N.L.R.B. 1247 (1966).
55 For a trenchant criticism of the "New Frontier" Board and its policies, see K. McGumEss,
THE NEW FRONTIER NLRB (1963).
54 156 N.L.R.B. at 1250.
55 Id.
56 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
57 There was considerable controversy over this holding with regard to the fact that the Board
essentially promulgated a "rule" without engaging in formal "rulemaking" proceedings pursuant
to section 6 of the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1982). This action prompted sharp criticism from the
Supreme Court. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764-65 (1969).
58 156 N.L.R.B. at 1239-40.
59 Id. at 1240-41.
6° Id. at 1240.
61 Id. at 1241 n.10.
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time, and where there are often large numbers of employees to reach. 62 The NLRB
rejected contentions that the turning over of such lists unduly infringed employer
property rights." The Board also rejected the contention that turning over such lists
would subject employees to undue harassment and coercion in their homes, 64 and ex-
plicitly held that union home visits were permissible."
Finally, the NLRB rejected the contention that it would be "inequitable" for it to
continue its policy of prohibiting employers from visiting employees at their homes,"
while now, under Excelsior, explicitly facilitating such home visits by unions. 67 The Board
in justifying the continuing home visits distinction pointed to the ability of employers to
communicate with employees at the access jobsite, and the corresponding severe limi-
tations on unions." Thus, the ability of unions, now equipped with complete and accurate
name and address lists, to visit employees at their homes was viewed by the NLRB as a
major counterpoint to employer in-plant access advantages.
But buried beneath Excelsior is the underlying question of whether the advantage
unions gain by engaging in home visits is one which really offsets employer communi-
cational advantages at the worksite. In General Electric, the NLRB ruled that broader
union organizational access issues such as the right of "captive audience" reply should
be deferred "until after the effects of Excelsior become known." 69 Yet, nearly two decades
after Excelsior and General Electric were decided, the NLRB has never squarely reconsi-
dered these issues." What follows is an attempt to fill this gaping void which the Board
has left.
III. UNION HOME VISITS AS AN "ALTERNATIVE CHANNEL" OF UNION ORGANIZATIONAL
COMMUNICATION
A. The Basic Doctrine
The NLRB's "home visits doctrine" really evolved out of two cases decided by the
Board in 1957. In the first case, Peoria Plastic Co., 71 the Board found employer home
visits to be "per se" coercive and therefore sufficient to overturn an election. 72 According
to the Board, the content of employers' statements during such visits was immaterial —
the mere conduct of an employer visiting an employee at his home to discuss unionization
was sufficient to set an election aside."
This proposition was elaborated on later that year in Plant City Welding & Tank Co. 74
It was not until Plant City Welding that the Board sharply differentiated between home
62 Id.
64 Id. at 1243.
64 id, at 1243-44.
" The Board rejected contentions that the use of the Excelsior names and addresses be limited
to mailings. Id. at 1246.
66 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text and infra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
67 156 N.L.R.B. at 1246 n.27.
66 Id.
69 General Electric, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1251.
7° See generally Getman, Goldberg & Herman, NLRB Regulation of Campaign Tactics: The Behav-
ioral Assumptions on Which the Board Regulates, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1465,1481 n.98 (1975).
" 117 N.L.R.B. 545 (1957).
72 Id. at 548.
73 Id. at 547-48.
79 119 N.L.R.B. 131 (1957).
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visits by employers and home visits by unions. 75 The Board rested this differentiation
on two prongs. First, the Board stated that unions are never in the position of "control
over tenure of employment and working conditions" of the kind which imparts the
coercive effect to employer home visits: 76 Second, and far more significant, the Board
stated that unions should be allowed to visit employee homes, while employers are not
so permitted, because "unions often do not have the opportunity to address employees
in assembled or informal groups." 77 It is this latter prong concerning the need for union
home visits to offset employer organizational advantages which, as noted above, 76 has
been developed in later cases as the major underlying theme of the "home visits doc-
trine." 79
B. The General Ineffectiveness of Union Home Visits as an Organizational "Balancer"
1. Timing of the Excelsior "Trigger"
One major factor which helps contribute to the general ineffectiveness of union
home visits as an organizational "balancer" is the timing of the triggering of the Board's
Excelsior mandates. Under Excelsior, employers are not required to furnish the regional
office of the NLRB a list of employee names and addresses for transmittal to the relevant
unions, until seven days after a labor representation election has been scheduled. 8° Such
elections are not scheduled, however, until the union has already provided the NLRB
with evidence that at least thirty percent of the employees in the given bargaining unit
are interested in being represented by the unions' Moreover, most unions, for strategic
purposes, do not seek to schedule such elections until at least fifty percent of the given
employees sign authorization cards or otherwise express their interest in union repre-
sentation." Thus, in many respects, it is the very early stages of union organizational
efforts, before representation elections have even been scheduled, that are among the
most critical. Successful employer anti-union efforts during this period of time may be
extremely effective in "nipping" union activity "in the bud." 55
" Id. at 133-34.
76 Id.
" Id. at 133.
76 See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
79 It is somewhat unclear, however, whether an election will be set aside where an employer
visits only a handful of homes. Compare The Hurley Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 282, 283 (1961) and F.N.
Calderwood, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 1211, 1214-15 (1959) (setting aside elections based on employer
visits to only whandful of homes), with Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1246 n.27 (noting in dictum that
the Board sets aside elections "because an employer or his agents calls on all or a majority of
employees in their homes in the period preceeding the election").
66 See Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1239-40.
6 ' 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (1981). Unions generally are able to establish this "showing of interest"
by way of authorization cards signed by the employees. See generally S. SCHLOSSBERG & F. SHERMAN,
ORGANIZING AND THE LAW 50-56 (1971).
88 See A. DEMARIA, How MANAGEMENT WINS UNION ORGANIZING CAMPAIGNS 37 (1980); 'Weiler,
Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1769,
1776 n.22 (1983).
8 ' See A. DEMARIA, .cupra note 82, at 55-65; K. GAGALA, UNION ORGANIZING AND STAYING
ORGANIZED 57-94 (1983). See generally United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 1054
(3d Cir. 1980) (upholding issuance of nonmajority NLRB bargaining order).
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In this context, as Professor William Gould has cogently observed, the rights af-
forded unions under Excelsior may be too little, too late." For without considerable access
to employees at the workplace, and facing the somewhat insurmountable job of reaching
employees at their homes without a comprehensive list of names and addresses," unions
may never even get to the point of petitioning for an election and consequently triggering
their Excelsior rights. Given this type of scenario, the organizational "advantage" unions
gain over employers through their ability to call on employees in their homes seems a
relatively shallow one.
2. The Suburban Shift
Even if unions had early access to the names and addresses of all employees, their
ability to call on employees in their homes has become increasingly difficult in recent
years with the growing tendency of employees to live, and many companies to locate, in
the sprawling suburbs. In this regard, it must be remembered that the Supreme Court's
decision in Babcock turned in significant degree on the fact that forty percent of the
company's employees lived in a small town only one mile from the jobsite, and were thus
arguably easily accessible to the union off working premises. 86
Professors Getman, Goldberg and Herman in their recent empirical study of union
representation elections found limited desire on the part of today's union organizers to
call on employees in their homes given "employees' tendency, increased by the interstate
highway system, to live scattered over a wide area."" Today, the norm is for employees
to drive, often lengthy distances, to work." In many respects, a commuter society has
developed." Today's employees, unlike many of those discussed in the Babcock case, do
not generally walk a mile or so to work.
The impact of this societal shift on union organizing and the problems it has
engendered call into stark question the underlying premise of the NLRB's 1957 holding
in Plant City Welding that union opportunities to visit employees at their homes offset
any employer workplace access advantages. As various observers have recognized," it is
harder, given current employee residential patterns, for unions to reach employees at
their homes today than it was three decades ago.
84 See Gould, Recent Developments Under the National Labor Relations Act: The Board and the Circuit
Courts, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 497, 507 n.35 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Gould, Recent Developments]. See
also J. KILGOUR, PREVENTIVE LABOR RELATIONS 200 (1981).
85 Suggestions that unions can easily obtain employee names and addresses by having supporters
record employee automobile license plate numbers and then compare them with public state listings
of vehicle owners' addresses seem rather specious given the degree of effort that such endeavors
require. See Falk Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. 716, 722 (1971) (Brown, member, dissenting).
86
 Babcock, 351 U.S. at 106.
87 See J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND
REALITY 94-95 (1976) [hereinafter cited as LAW AND REALITY].
88 See generally J. MEYER, J. KAIN & M. WOHL, THE URBAN TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM 60-82
(1966). Cf. Broomfield, Preemptive Federal Jurisdiction Over Concerted Trespassory Union Activity, 83
HARV. L. REV. 552, 553 (1970) (citing the difficulties unions face in communicating with workers
whenever employees drive to work).
85 See generally J. MEYER, J. KAIN & M. WOHL, supra note 88.
4° See, e.g., LAW AND REALITY, supra note 87, at 94-95; Broomfield, supra note 88, at 553. See
generally Gould,' The Question of Union Activity on Company Property, 18 VAND. L. REV. 73, 102-03
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Gould, Company Property].
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Indeed, the impact of the "suburban shift" on the ability of unions to make home
visits has, to some extent, been recognized by the Board and the courts." The leading
case in this regard is perhaps the NLRB's 1970 decision in Central Hardware Co. 92 In
Central Hardware, the Board for the first time suggested that the dispersion of employee
residences throughout an urban area, in this case metropolitan Indianapolis, made union
home visits an ineffective means of communication." The Board also pointed to the
testimony of a union organizer that he had to go back to employee residences an average
of five or six times in order to find someone at home." Resting its decision on these
bases, the Board, applying Babcock, found no adequate "alternative channels of com-
munication" open to the union, and ordered that nonemployee union organizers be granted
access to the company's parking lot."
On appeal, however, the Eighth Circuit reversed the Board's decision." The court
rejected the notion that residential dispersion of employees made union home visits
ineffective, and stated that it was not surprising for employees not to be at home when
unexpected visits are made without prior notice or appointment. 97
 Moreover, the appeals
court emphasized that the burden is strongly on the union to demonstrate that channels
of communication other than access to the workplace are not available, and that the
union had not met this heavy burden in the instant case."
The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Central Hardware, however, missed the point in many
respects. First, the reason why many union organizers do not call employees in adirance
to make appointments before calling on them at their homes is that there tends to be a
greater likelihood for employees to say "no" to such a possible visit when contacted over
the phone, than when confronted by a union organizer at their doorstep. 99 Moreover,
while there is little doubt, as the appeals court pointed out, that unions are still technically
able to reach employees despite "suburban sprawl," the critical issue is at what cost?
To what extent should unions, faced with increasingly limited resources, w° be forced,
as one commentator has put it, to "run the gauntlet?"'°' What level of "transaction
" For an excellent review of cases along these lines, see Texas Note, supra note 21, at 131-36.
92 181 N.L.R.B. 491 (1970), rev'd, 468 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1972).
94 Id. at 496.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 491-92 & n.2. The Board also rested its decision on the independent ground that the
employer's parking lot was "quasi-public" property under the Supreme Court's decision in Amal-
gamated Food Employees Union v, Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968). Central Hardware,
181 N.L.R.B. at 491-92 & 492 n.2. This part of the decision was reversed by the Supreme Court
in Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972), where the Court held that the parking lot
at issue did not fall into the Logan Valley definition of "quasi-public" property. Id. at 547-48. The
Supreme Court then remanded the case to the Eighth Circuit for a decision purely pursuant to
Babcock with regard to whether the union had shown that "alternative channels of communication"
were ineffective. Id. at 548. The Supreme Court expressly overruled Logan Valley four years later
in the case of Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976).
96
 Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 468 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1972).
97 Id. at 255-56.
9' Id.
99
 K. GACALA, supra note 83, at 166.
I"" See Weiler, supra note 82, at 1771-74 (outlining the decline in union density, and thus in
union dues resources).
1" See Gould, Recent Developments, supra note 84, at 507. See generally1 KILGOUR, supra note 84,
at 199.
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costs" 1 " can reasonably be imposed on unions in their organizational quests? In sum, it
appears that due to greater dispersion in employee residential patterns, visits to em-
ployees at their homes have become an increasingly costly, and decreasingly effective,
union organizing method.
3. Big Units/Small Units
A related issue to that of "suburban sprawl" in the context of the viability of employee
home visits as an effective union organizational tool is the question of representation
election unit size. In determining the size of a given employee election unit, the NLRB
relies heavily on the "community of interest" of the employees, as well as on any past
bargaining history.LOS
As a general rule, unions seek the smallest employee election unit possible, and
employers the largest unit possible.'" The reason for this, as Judge Richard Posner has
recently observed, 105 is at least in part because it takes more resources for a union to
campaign and win votes in a larger unit than in a smaller one.' 65 In the context of home
visits, it is much easier for union representatives to visit the homes of twenty employees
than it is for them to visit the homes of one hundred employees, assuming that the
homes are all geographically dispersed along roughly the same lines.'"
The importance of the size of the election unit to the ability of unions to campaign
effectively in labor representation elections has been forcefully articulated by Professor
Derek Bok.'°8 According to Professor Bok, unions run into "substantial" problems in
communicating with employees once the number of employees in the given election unit
reaches about seventy-five.'°• The percentage of representation elections involving units
with this number of employees or more, however, has consistently remained at only
about twenty percent."° Consequently, Professor Bok does not envision any major prob-
102 The pathbreaking article in this area was published in 1960 by Professor Ronald Coase. See
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). For an excellent article outlining the
general costs and benefits of union organizing, see Voos, Union Organizing: Costs and Benefits, 36
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 576 (1983).
1 ° 3 See generally R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 68-72
(1976); Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REV. 353, 380-83 (1984).
104 See R. GORMAN, supra note 103, at 67-68; Heneman & Sandver, Predicting the Outcome of
Union Certification Elections: A Review of the Literature, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL, REV. 537, 555-56 (1983).
But see generally Leslie, .supra note 103, at 389-418 (suggesting that unions might be better off with
larger units, as such units would facilitate mediation of conflicts among subgroups of employees).
Professor Leslie's contention in this regard, however, has been strongly disputed by Judge/Professor
Richard Posner. See Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 988, 1009 (1984).
LOS See Posner, supra note 104, at 1008.
1°0 judge Posner also emphasized that workers in a smaller unit arc more likely to have
convergent interests, thus making it easier for the union to directly appeal to their needs and to
later meet those needs in the bargaining process. Id,
ml See generally Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 94-95, 97 (1964) (pointing out the relative ease
of contacting small numbers of employees at their homes versus contacting thousands of employees
via this method, and questioning how many house calls a union can reasonably be expected to make
given a set number of employees living within a certain radius).
to, Id. at 101-02.
' 11" Id. at 101.
' 1 ° Compare FORTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 220, table
17 (1981), with TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 183,
table 17 (1963).
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lems in giving unions special access to employees in the twenty percent of elections
involving units of seventy-five or more workers."'
While there is obviously a degree of arbitrariness in setting the cutoff for special
union access at seventy-five or any other number,'" the basic premise underlying Pro-
fessor Bok's thesis appears to be a sound one. It does seem plausible that, as a general
rule, the more employees there are in a given election unit the more difficult it is for
the union to communicate with them. In this context, providing unions with special
rights of access in the twenty percent of elections involving the largest units of employees,
may well be a reasonable approach worthy of more in-depth consideration.
4. Competing Attentions
One final factor hampering the effectiveness of union home visits as a "balancer"
of labor-management organizational rights is that in conducting such visits union orga-
nizers are competing against a wide range of after-work activities in an effort to gain
the worker's attention." 3
 Unlike at the workplace, no person can be a "captive audience"
in his or her own home.'"
This factor has perhaps become more pronounced in recent decades, as at least
some sociologists and other observers have noted an increasing trend for workers to
separate or bifurcate their working lives from their personal lives." 5 As one commentator
has put it:
[T]he value of home visits as a tool for communicating information on self-
organization and collective bargaining is diminished to the extent organizers
find the employees distracted from the relationships and dissatisfactions of
their working lives. At home, employees must attend to their responsibilities
as parents, spouses, and consumers and are far removed from the work-
related concerns that properly should guide them in matters affecting their
organizational life. The "compartmentalization" of modern life may leave
workers unresponsive to the organizer's appeal to their productive economic
existence — to their existence as employees. 116
Thus, once at home a worker may prefer to completely forget about what goes on at
work, a fact which makes the life of a union organizer trying to appeal to the worker by
way of home visit all the more difficult.
5. The Overwhelming Nature of Employer Access
a. The Basic Construct
Even assuming that union visits to employee homes are a more effective organiza-
tional method than they appear to be, their effectiveness as a "balancer" of employer
organizational rights is likely to be called into question given the overwhelming strength
Bok, supra note 107, at 102.
12 This is a fact readily admitted by Professor Bok. See id.
See generally Law AND REALITY, supra note 87, at 94-95.
" 4 See Texas Note, supra note 21, at 159 n.276.
"6 See, e.g., tumbler, The City and Community, 3 J. URB. H Isl. . 427,440 (1977). This issue is one
which could hypothetically be subject to empirical testing.
"6 Texas Note, supra note 21, at 159.
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of employer opportunities to effectively communicate with employees regarding union-
ization. These employer communicational advantages have been recognized with stun-
ning candor by some leading management representatives. Alfred T. DeMaria, one of
the nation's better known management employee relations attorneys, has written:
[Miany of those in management believe that unions have the advantages in
communicating messages to the employees. Yet the reverse is true. The
employer has the decided advantage in this context .... The employer's
greater opportunity to communicate with employees, the virtually complete
access to the minds of the voters during working hours, and the control
management can exert over employees give the employer a considerable
advantage over his union counterparts. This advantage can legally be utilized
to produce a winning vote on election day.'"
In this context, 118 the ability of unions to visit employees at their homes, while employers
can not, seems of relatively minor consequence.
Employer communicational advantages often start well before a union is even on
the scene. Employers have the opportunity to express to workers from the onset of their
employment the disadvantages of unionization."9 But once a union does appear on the
scene, employers can be expected to act with greater fervor.
First, employers generally have complete and accurate lists of employee names and
addresses from the very beginning of any union organizational efforts. While employers
Can not make use of these records to call on employees at their homes, 120 they can make
very effective use of such records by sending mail to the employees' homes. Indeed,
some management observers believe that personalized letters sent home to the spouses
of employees, addressing such issues as the possibility of strikes and union violence, are
among the most effective methods employers can use in thwarting union efforts. 12 ' This
is particularly true since unions, during the early stages of organization, rarely possess
complete name and address lists of the kind which would enable them to attempt to
rebut employer correspondence of this kind. 122
Second, under Nutorte,' 29 and as Mr. DeMaria has noted, employers do have "virtually
complete access to the minds of the voters during working hours." 124 Of course, em-
ployees who support the union are free to talk to other employees regarding unionization
during coffee breaks, rest periods, and so forth. But many such employees are afraid to
A. DEMARIA, supra note 82, at xvii.
Other leading management representatives, particularly in terms of addressing possible
reforms of the system by Congress, have been considerably more demure arguing that an "equal"
balance in rights in this regard between management and labor exists. See, e.g., Nash, The Labor
Reform Act of 1977: A Detailed Analysis, 4 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 59, 59-74 (1978).
119 See Weiler, supra note 82, at 1815 ("the employer has had ample opportunity and incentive
to demonstrate the advantages of an individual bargaining regime before the union comes on the
scene"). Management consultants and representatives frequently emphasize the need for "preven-
tive" labor relations. See, e.g., R. LEWIS & W. KRUPMAN, WINNING NLRB ELECTIONS: MANAGEMENT'S
STRATEGY AND PREVENTIVE PROGRAMS 1-3 (1979).
in See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
121 Telephone interview with Peter J. Carre, Management Attorney (May 12, 1985); A. DE-
MARIA, supra note 82, at 117.
122 It must be remembered that union rights to such lists under Excelsior are only triggered
seven days after an election has been scheduled. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
izs See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
124 A. DEMARIA, supra note 82, at xvii.
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take action of this kind because it may put them in disfavor with their employer. 129 This
is particularly so since, as Professor Paul Weiler has forcefully pointed out,' 26 the rem-
edies such employees are afforded should their employer unlawfully discipline or dis-
charge them for "talking union" are not especially effective ones. 122 Moreover, employee
union supporters frequently do not have the training or experience to convey the union's
appeal with the effectiveness of professional union organizers, and such professional
organizers are generally excluded from the workplace under Babcock. 128
In contrast, employers, frequently advised by highly paid and highly knowledgeable
attorneys and consultants,' 29 face no such difficulties in getting their story across. Under
Nulone, employers are basically free to use the workplace for organizational purposes.'"
The most potent force in the employer's arsenal in this regard is, as noted above,'"
probably the "captive audience" speech. The employer's ability to call all his or her
employees together, "en masse," during paid working time for the purpose of listening
to an anti-union address seems to give the employer a considerable practical and psy-
chological edge.'" This fact appears to have been at least implicitly recognized by the
NLRB in its holding in Peerless Plywood CO. /33 that employer "captive audience" speeches
during the twenty-four hours prior to a representation election are violative of election
"laboratory conditions." 1 " But employers, of course, work around Peerless Plywood to the
greatest extent possible, scheduling "captive audience" speeches which begin twenty-four
and one-half hours before the election and end just as the twenty-four hour clock begins
to run.'"
In any event, there appears to be rather powerful subjective evidence to the effect
that employers generally have a considerable communicational advantage over unions.
This advantage significantly outweighs any opportunity unions may gain through their
ability to visit employees at their homes while employers can not. In recent years,
however, this subjective evidence has been buttressed by a major empirical study ex-
amining this issue. -
1 " See Note, Not as a Stranger: Non-Employee Union Organizers Soliciting on Company Property, 65
YALE L.J. 423, 427 n.33 (1956).
126 See Weiler, supra note 82, at 1787-1803.
127 Id. at 1777-78. See also Smisek, New Remedies for Discriminatory Discharges of Union Adherents
During Organizing Campaigns, 5 Brous. REL. L.J. 564, 572-76 (1983).
128 See NLRB v. S	 H Grossinger's, Inc., 372 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1967). See generally C.
DAUGHERTY, LABOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 421-22 (5th ed. 1941).
129 See generally Bernstein, Union-Busting: From Benign Neglect to Malignant Growth, 14 U.C.D. L.
REV. 1 (1980); Bethel, Profilling From Unfair Labor Practices: A Proposal to Regulate Management
Representatives, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 506 (1984).
'm See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 31-46 and accompanying text.
192 See id. See also Penn Comment, supra note 13, at 779-80; Goldberg, Getman & Brett, Union
Representation Elections: Law and Reality: The Authors Respond to the Critics, 79 MICH. L. REV. 564, 591-
93 (1981). See generally Dickens, supra note 31, at 570-71; Gould, Company Property, supra note 90,
at 100; Summers, Past Premises, Present Failures, and Future Needs in Labor Legislation, 31 BUFFALO L.
REV. 9, 21 (1982). But see Smither, Does the Goalpost Move When Employers Kick About Union Misconduct
During Elections?, 15 LAB. L.J. 578, 580-81 (1964) (arguing, it seems rather speciously, that employer
rights to address employees "en masse" are not equivalent to union "buttonhole" organizing tech-
niques).
199
	 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
154 Id. at 429.
'" See A. DEMARIA, supra note 82, at 279. But see generally Dickens, supra note 31, at 570-71
(employer campaign meetings later in campaign have relatively less impact).
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b. Empirical Evidence
Professors Getman, Goldberg and Herman in their major 1976 empirical study of
labor representation elections reached far different conclusions regarding the existing
"balance" of labor/management communicational abilities than those reached, on more
subjective bases, by the Supreme Court in Babcock and Nutone. 136 While the major finding
of their study was that workers are not meaningfully affected by labor election campaign
propaganda,'" (a conclusion which has drawn considerable criticism), the researchers
did find a powerful correlation between attendance at union and company meetings and
employee familiarity with the content of the campaigns.'" Moreover, there was evidence
that attending union meetings and familiarity with the union campaign were, in partic-
ular, associated with employees switching their election vote to the union.'"
The researchers also found, though, that a far higher proportion of employees
(eighty-three percent) attended company meetings than attended union meetings (thirty-
six percent),'" a situation strongly influenced by the fact that company meetings are
held at the workplace during paid working time, while union meetings are held outside
of the workplace during employee leisure hours.'" In addition, most of the employees
attending union meetings were found to have already supported the union, while com-
pany meetings were attended by a broad cross-section of union supporters, company
supporters, and undecided voters.'"
Based on this data, and given their finding that relatively few employees were
contacted by unions at their homes or by fellow employee union supporters at the
workplace,'" Professors Getman, Goldberg, and Herman concluded, the Supreme
Court's holding in Nutone aside, that a substantial imbalance in organizational abilities
between management and labor exists.'" In their view unions, because of their basic
inability to gain access to the workplace, are at a "substantial disadvantage" in terms of
effectively communicating with employees. t" To ameliorate this inequity, the professors
suggested that companies campaigning or holding campaign meetings at the workplace
during working time should be required to afford unions "equal access" opportunities
to also campaign or hold meetings at the workplace during working time.'" While noting
thãt there may be some "practical problems" with enforcing these requirements, the
professors pointed out that these problems are not "insuperable," and that such equal
' 36 See generally Goldberg, Empirical Research in Labor Law: Problems, Prospects and Pleasures, 1981
U. ILL. L. REV. 15, 29.
' 37 The researchers found that the vast majority of employees voted in accord with their pre-
campaign intent. Law AND REALITY, supra note 87, at 64. This conclusion has drawn considerable
criticism. See Dickens, supra note 31; Eames, An Analysis of the Union Voting Study from a Trade
Unionist's Point of View, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1181, 1182 (1976); King, Pre-Election Conduct — Expanding
Employer Rights and Some New and Renewed Perspectives, 2 I NDUS. REL. L.J. 185, 210- 13 (1977); Weiler,
supra note 82, at 1782-86.
138 LAW AND REALITY, supra note 87, at 95-96.
139 /d. at 103-107.
"D Id. at 95-96.
" 1 Id. at 94-96. Thus, the "opportunity cost" for workers to attend workplace meetings is
considerably less. See generally D. LEE & R. MCNOWN, ECONOMICS IN OUR TIME 4-6 (1983).
'42 LAW AND REALITY, supra note 87, at 96.
143 Id. at 93-95.
' 44 Id. at 96, 156.
"5 Id. at 96.
"6 Id. at 157-58.
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opportunities for union/management communication are particularly important in light
of their call for labor election speech deregulation. 147
In sum, the empirical work of Professors Getman, Goldberg, and Herman adds
weight to the evidence that unions are generally at a considerable disadvantage in
communicating their side of the story to employees,-a disadvantage which is not overcome
by the advantage they gain over employers by being able to visit employees at their
homes. The employer's ability, and the union's general inability, to reach employees at
the workplace seems to be the overriding factor determining labor/management orga-
nizational effectiveness, 148 a fact which must be kept clearly in mind in formulating any
new model for union organizing.
c. Exceptions to the Rule
For every general rule there are, of course, exceptions, and these exceptions must
be taken into account in formulating any reform proposal. The notion that the special
right of unions to conduct home visits is not an effective "balancer" of employer/union
organizational rights, is predicated on the strength of the employer's ability to make
effective use of the workplace in communicating his or her ideas to the employees. But
what happens when the employer's advantage in this regard is not present? This was
the interesting issue involved in NLRB v. Daniel Construction Co., 149 perhaps the leading
federal court case directly interpreting the "home visits doctrine," and one worthy of
closer examination if only for its excellent illustration of the complexity of this area and
the difficulties inherent in attempting "broad-brush" reforms.
In Daniel, the construction company refused to turn over to the union the required
Excelsior list of employee names and addresses, and the NLRB sought enforcement of a
subpoena requiring the company to turn over the list. 150
 The company based its refusal
on the grounds that the list would give the union an undue organizational advantage.'"
The company, citing the Excelsior case itself, 152 asserted that the basic purpose of the
Excelsior rule was to enable unions to visit employees at their homes (a privilege not
afforded employers) thus offsetting employer advantages in terms of being able to
personally contact employees at the jobsite.'"
The company asserted that in the case at bar, however, due to the vagaries of the
construction business, two-thirds of the employees eligible to vote in the given represen-
tation election were no longer employed by the company or present at its jobsites.'"
Consequently, the company argued that giving the union the Excelsior list would give it
an undue advantage in terms of personally contacting the workers.'"
The federal district judge found this argument persuasive, at least in part, stating:
147 Id. at 158.
1 " See generally Gould, Union Organizational Rights and the Concept of "Quasi-Public" Property, 49
MINN. L. REV. 505,513 (1965) (outlining how the workplace is the "focal point" for organizational
effort). Of course, this area is open to further empirical testing.
199 299 F. Supp. 423 (D.S.C. 1968), vacated, 418 F.2d 790 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1039 (1970).
'w Id, at 424,
15 ' Id. at 425.
I " Id.
155 Id,
1 " Id. at 425-26.
155 Id. at 426.
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To enforce the subpoena as applied for by the Board under the particular
and special circumstances of this case would arbitrarily create an inequality
as to the rights of the two parties to the election. On the other hand, to
refuse enforcement entirely would be to give the employer the unfair ad-
vantage that the Excelsior rule sought to overcome. In this situation and
because of the unique and unusual facts of this case, I feel that the subpoena
should be enforced on this specific condition, i.e., the respondent shall only
supply such names and addresses to the petitioning union with the express
restriction that the union shall communicate solely by mail with those em-
ployees who have not been on the payroll of the respondent within thirty
days of this Order. As to all other employees, the right of the access by the
union to the employees will not be restricted or limited by this Order. 156
The district court made no analysis of whether the visitation of employee homes
was really as effective a union organizing technique as it presumed it to be. On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit held that the question was not ripe for judicial review until after the
NLRB took final action on the case's certification proceedings, thus effectively avoiding
a firm resolution of the unique problem presented.'" The Supreme Court denied
certiorari in the case.'"
The chief lesson of Daniel is that things are seldom quite as simple as they seem.
While as a general rule it appears that employers enjoy clear organizational advantages
vis-a-vis unions, this is not always the case. Formulations for reform in this area must be
designed to take exceptions to the rule clearly into account.
C. Union Home Visits and Employee Rights of Privacy
Even if union home visits did, contrary to prevailing evidence, serve an important
role in balancing union versus management organizational rights, the question must be
asked at what cost in terms of individual employee privacy rights such "balancing" comes.
Of course, there is no clear evidence, regardless of the assertions made by those who
opposed the NLRB's adoption of the Excelsior rule, 159 that unions which engage in such
home visits unduly harass and coerce employees. On the other hand, though, as Professor
Bok has forcefully pointed out, 16° there is also, contrary to the Board's holding in Plant
City Welding,' 6 ' no clear evidence that employees would be unduly intimidated if em-
ployers were permitted to visit them at their homes. Moreover, the Act does indeed
protect employees against coercive employer or union campaign behavior. 162
Nevertheless, analysis along these lines seems somewhat disingenuous. As Professor
Charles Alan Reich has pointed out, in today's society the job has become perhaps the
most important "property" an individual possesses.'" Most employees, however, are
' 56 Id. at 427 (emphasis added).
' 57 418 F.2d 790, 792 (4th Cir. 1969)..
Ise
	 U.S. 1039 (1970).
159 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
See Bok, supra note 107, at 105-06.
16i See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
1'a
	
behavior, if properly documented, would constitute an unfair labor practice under the
Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(b)(1) (1982).
'" See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 739 (1964).
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employees "at will" who can be fired at any time and for any reason.'" Given such a
construct, it is hard to imagine an employee telling his boss to "go away" when the boss
comes knocking on his door. Whether the union wins or loses the election, the employee
will have to live with the employer, and it would be ridiculous for the employee to risk
antagonizing him or her.
On the other hand, though, it may not be particularly advisable for employees to
follow the advice some employers have given them, to "slam the door in the union's
faces" when the union comes calling. 1 R' If the union wins, the employee will have to live
with it on an ongoing basis, and under the Supreme Court's decision in Vacs v. Sipes 166
unions are afforded a fairly wide range of discretion in terms of choosing which employee
grievances to pursue to arbitration and otherwise administering labor agreements. 167
Why then would an employee want to risk being on the "outs" with the union because
he turned them away from his home? 1" Even if the union loses the election, it, or
another union, may come back in a following year' 69 and be successful. From the
employee's perspective, taking an antagonistic approach seems to make little sense.
Of course, employees are, under the Act, protected from union or management
reprisals taken because the employee turned them away, as well as from "coercive" union
or management behavior during such home visits. 170 But, unfair labor practices charges
brought in such instances may take years to resolve. 17 1 Moreover, there would seem to
be considerable problems of proof when bringing a charge based on coercive employer/
union conduct during a home visit. Absent, perhaps, a video-cassette recording of the
entire visit, how can one easily prove that something "coercive" was indeed said or done?
In addition, what types of speech or action are going to be deemed illegally "coercive"
in this context? 172
Beyond all this, however, there seem to be strong general arguments in favor of the
fact that employees, regardless of the labor policy implications, should enjoy the basic
right to be left alone in their homes. It is true that the Supreme Court has, in other
contexts, emphasized the value of door-to-door solicitation as a method of promoting
free speech.' 73 But, these precedents are not, as Professor Bok has pointed out, 174 binding
in any legal sense, and there are considerable differences between labor election home
visits and other types of door-to-door solicitations such as those involving the sale of
164 See Bierman & Youngblood, Employment At Will and the South Carolina Experiment, 7 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 28,28-29 (1985).
166 See, e.g., Ripley Mfg. Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 1132,1140-41 (1963).
166 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
'0 Id. at 192.
166 Being on the "outs" with the union may not be a particularly pleasant thing, See generally
Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What Constititutes Fair Rep-
resentation?, 126 U. PA. L. Rev. 251,270-72,274-75 (1977).
169 There is, of course, a statutory election bar rule which prohibits another representation
election in a given bargaining unit for one year after such an election has been held. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c)(3) (1982).
' 7 " See generally Penn Comment, supra note 13, at 786-87.
'" See generally Weiler, supra note 82, at 1796-98.
172 See infra notes 199-212 and accompanying text, discussing the difficulties members of
Congress had in wrestling with this issue.
1 " See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141,141-42 (1943).
1 " Bok, supra note 107, at 100.
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encyclopedias or life insurance.L" Moreover, in Stanley v. Georgia 176 and other recent
cases, the Supreme Court has placed particular emphasis on the importance of the home
as a place where individuals should enjoy special privacy rights)" Thus, the home in
many respects should be seen as a "safe haven," a place where, particularly given the
advent of two worker families,'" employees can get away from it all. 179 Under such
circumstances, the prohibition of labor election home visits by either labor or management
would seem appropriate.
In sum, the efficacy of union labor election home visits as a "balancer" of labor/
management organizational rights must be weighed against the intrusion on individual
employee rights of privacy such visits pose. Given this intrusion, and the fact that unions
have generally not found them to be a particularly effective tool in offsetting employer
workplace communicational advantages,'" the continued viability of home visits in the
labor representation election context seems open to considerable question.
IV. FORMULATING A NEW MODEL FOR UNION ORGANIZING
A. The Labor Reform Ad of 1977-1978
1. The General Approach
Provisions regarding the proper parameters for union organizing were perhaps the
most controversial'"' of all those contained in the proposed Labor Law Reform Act of
1977-1978, which was passed by the United States House of Representatives but suc-
cessfully filibustered in the United States Senate.L 82 The basic approach of the proposed
legislation was to broaden opportunities for union organizational access to employees.
This approach was premised on the notion that unions were at a competitive disadvan-
tage vis-a-vis employers in organizational access,I 83
 a notion the sponsors of the proposed
amendments attempted to substantiate by citing the work of Professors Getman, Gold-
berg, and Herman as well as other data.'"
As originally introduced, the Democratic majority bill in the House of Representa-
tives contained the following language dealing with this subject:
175 See Texas Note, supra note 2!, at IOU. See generally Developments in the Law — Elections, 88
Harty. L. REV. 1111, 1234-35 (1975) (differentiating the regulation of labor elections from that of
political elections).
'" 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
' 7 ' See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONS - ITEUTIONAL LAW 984-85 (1978).
178 In recent years the number of females in the workforce has jumped dramatically. See generally
Northrup, Labor Market Trends and Policies in the 1980's, in R. SCHULER & S. YOUNGBLOOD, READINGS
IN PERSONNEL. AND HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 25-26 (1984).
179 See Texas Note, supra note 21, at 170-71. See generally Lewis, NLRB Intrudes on the Right of
Privacy, 17 LAB. LT 280,283-84 (1966).
18" See supra notes 80-111 and accompanying text.
"" See H.R. REt>. No. 637, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1977); see generally Bredhoff, supra note 30,
at 27-37; Kramer, supra note 30, at 4-13.
'" For an excellent and comprehensive overview of this subject and how it fared in the 95th
Congress, see I'enn Comment, supra note 13 at 755-97,
185 See generally supra notes 117-48 and accompanying text.
I" See H.R. REP. No. 637, supra note 181, at 27-39; S. REP. No. 628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-
26 (1978).
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The Board shall within twelve months after the date of enactment of the
Labor Reform Act of 1977 issue regulations to implement the provisions of
[the relevant sections] including rules ... which shall, subject to reasonable
conditions including due regard for the needs of the employer to maintain
continuity of production, assure that if an employer or employer represen-
tative addresses the employees on its premises or during working time on
issues relating to representation by a labor organization during a period of
time that employees are seeking representation by a labor organization the
employees shall be assured of an equal opportunity to obtain in an equivalent
manner information concerning such issues from such labor organization.'"
While this language in and of itself is somewhat unclear, it was clarified during debate
on the House floor to mean only that an employer delivering a "captive audience" speech
during a labor representation election campaign would be under an obligation to give
the relevant union or unions's° an "equal opportunity" right to reply.'" Amendments
on the House floor further clarified the fact that employers would be required to pay
employees during such working-time union "captive audience" replies.'" House floor
action also afforded employers the right to reply to union speeches at union halls.'"
Action in the United States Senate on this subject took a broader tack. The original
Carter Administration/Senate Democratic Majority bill, S. 2467, 190 essentially incorpo-
rated the union access/free speech recommendations made by Professors Getman, Gold-
berg and Herman on this subject,["' with respect to affording outside organizers oppor-
tunities to respond at the workplace to all employer campaigning, albeit during
nonworking time and in nonworking areas.'" S. 2467 also called for greater deregulation
of labor election speech,'" thus incorporating the major thrust of the Getman, Goldberg,
and Herman study, 1 ° as well as a provision in this regard sought by various Republican
opponents to the original House Administration/Democratic bill. 19 °
When S. 2467 began to run into major trouble on the Senate floor, Senate Majority
Leader Robert Byrd offered a substitute bill for it. The "Byrd substitute," offered on
June 8, 1978, retained provisions calling for the deregulation of labor election speech,
but significantly watered down the "equal access" provisions of the original Senate bill
by eliminating the right of unions to reply to employer "captive audience" speeches
during working time.'°° Instead, the bill proposed that both "captive audience" speeches
ins
	 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b)(1) (1977), reprinted in Labor Reform Act of 1977:
Hearings on H.R. 8410 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 5-6 (1977).
Ls" The problem of possible multiple unions and how to divide reply time under such circum-
stances was not meaningfully considered. See generally Penn Comment, supra note 13, at 783 &
DD. 163-67.
1 fl 7 See 123 Cow.. REC. 32,483-84 (1977) (statement of Congressman Thompson); id. at 32,486
(colloquy between Congressmen Glickman and Thompson).
'"" See id. at 32,495-98.
149 See id. at 32,489-98.
"" S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in S. REP. No. 628, supra note 184, at 45-60.
"'See LAW AND REALITY, SUPM note 87, at 158.
'" See S. REP. No. 628, supra note 184, at 23-26.
L9' See S. 2467, supra note 190, § 6.
194 See LAW AND REALITY, supra note 87, at 159.
11' 5 See S. REP. No. 628, supra note 184, at 26-27.
' 96 See Penn Comment, supra note 13, at 795-97.
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and other employer campaigning within the plant were to be offset by permitting a
limited number of nonemployee union organizers to campaign in designated nonworking
areas during nonworking time. 197 Even the watering down of this provision, however,
did not help carry the day, and on June 22, 1978 a successful filibuster forced the "Byrd
substitute" off the Senate floor and back to the Senate Labor Committee where it died
a slow death.'"
2. The Home Visits Issue
Congress did address the home visits issue as part of its consideration of the Labor
Reform Act. During the House Labor Committee's mark-up of the legislation, minority
Republican members of the committee informally offered an amendment to the bill's
"equal access" provision which would have permitted employers to make home visits
while insuring the "sanctity of employees' homes."'" After the committee rejected this
amendment, the late Congressman John Ashbrook then formally offered it on the floor
of the House.'" Under Congressman Ashbrook's proposal, employers would have an
"equal opportunity" to visit employees at their homes, although the Board would at the
same time be instructed to adopt rules to insure "due regard for the needs of the
employees to enjoy the privacy of their homes." 201 The basic thrust of the proposal was,
according to Congressman Ashbrook, to apply a more even-handed approach, that is, if
unions were to be allowed to respond to employer "captive audience" speeches, employ-
ers should he allowed to campaign by visiting employees at their homes."'
The proposal, however, came under immediate attack from House Democratic
members. Then House Labor Committee Chairman Frank Thompson quickly labeled
the proposal the "trick or treat" or "door-bell" amendment, and chastised it as repre-
senting an invasion on employee rights of privacy. 203 Congressman George Miller argued,
along the lines of the NLRB's holding in the Plant City Welding case,'" that there is a
distinction between the "pressure" being brought to hear by a union organizer who has
"no control" over a worker approaching the worker at home, and the pressure brought
by the person who "signs the paychecks" paying a visit. 21 '3
Congressman Ashbrook, however, rebutted such assertions stating that the record
on the issue of labor intimidation is not "one-sided."'" This theme was further developed
on the House floor by Congressman Edwards of Oklahoma who stated that "the union
organizer can be at least as intimidating as the employer.""" Moreover, in terms of
' 97 In this regard, it could be argued that the "Byrd substitute" adopted among the worst of all
possible reforms in this area since it sanctioned a significant incursion on employer property rights,
even though this incursion arguably did little to ameliorate the union/management organizational
imbalance. See id. at 796-97.
198 For a good discussion of the political dynamics of the proposed legislation, see generally
Rosen, Labor Law Reform: Dead or Alive?, 57 U. DET. ]. URR. L. 1 (1979).
' 99 See H.R. REP. No. 637, supra note 181, at 71.
20" See 123 CONG. REC. 32,489 (1977).
20 I Id,
201 1d. at 32,490.
20 '1d. at 32,490-91.
201 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
203
 123 CONG. REC. at 32,492-93.
206 1d. at 32,493.
207 Id.
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employee privacy, Congressman Ashbrook pointed out that the proposed amendment
created no "right" to enter anyone's home, but merely the "opportunity" for the employer
to knock on the voter's door, the "same opportunity afforded unions." 2" In addition,
the NLRB would be instructed to develop rules so that such employer visits would not
improperly intrude on employee rights of privacy.
The majority of members of the House, however, did not find such counterargu-
ments persuasive. Indeed, some members even questioned whether either unions or
employers should be permitted to campaign by visiting employees at their homes. Thus,
Congressman O'Brien of Illinois stated:
1 just do not think we improve this situation by compounding the felony. I
do not agree that either side should be granted the privilege of accosting an
employee at his home.
I think that [such activity] puts undue pressure on the employee, his
wife and the entire family. Such activity does not belong at the home. I think
this is had law on both counts. 200
No formal amendments were offered, however, to eliminate the opportunity for unions
to campaign by conducting home visits, and indeed, there was not even any further
exploration of this issue by the legislative body. Moreover, no consideration was given
by House members to the issue of whether union home visits were really serving a
positive role as a "balancer" of union versus management organizational rights.m In-
stead, Congressman Ashbrook's proposed amendment to afford employers the right to
visit employees at their homes was simply tabled. 2 "
3. Problems Raised and Lessons Learned
The issues raised regarding union organizational access during the 95th Congress's
consideration of labor reform legislation are illustrative of the complexity of the problems
involved in this area of the law. While there seemed to be some consensus that the existing
BabcocklNutone model?" needed to be reformed to give unions greater organizational
access opportunities, there was no agreement regarding how precisely to construct such
change. Is giving unions the right to reply to employer "captive audience" speeches
sufficient to counterbalance employer organizational advantages, or is greater union
access necessary? What about employer rights of free speech? Should greater freedoms
be afforded in this area in return for greater union avenues of organizational access?
To what extent would provisions such as those calling for employer access to the union
hall be substantively meaningful, or merely "symbolic" in nature?
In many respects the area of union/management organizational rights is a tightly
woven tapestry, with the various elements of NLRB regulation being very closely inter-
related to each other. 213 One major problem with Congress's considerations in this area
during the labor reform debate was the fact that at times salient interrelationships were
essentially overlooked. This seemed particularly true with regard to the debate concern-
2°' Id. at 32,492.
200 Id.
210 See generally supra notes 80-111 and accompanying text.
211 123 CONG. REC. at 32,493.
212 See supra notes 23-51 and accompanying text.
"3 See generally Bok, supra note 107; Penn Comment, supra note 13.
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ing the "home visits doctrine," where the doctrine's key historical role as a purported
"balancer" of union/management organizational rights 20 received no evaluation or
meaningful attention. 2 " Thus, one important lesson that clearly seems to have emanated
from the 1977-1978 congressional debate in this area is that reform must not be ap-
proached in a piecemeal manner. Instead, attempts must be made to carefully evaluate
all the different interrelated pieces of the puzzle, and construct an integrated model for
reform. Moreover, efforts should be made in constructing such a model to give ample
consideration 10 possible new approaches and ideas, as opposed to merely relying on
approaches of the past.
What follows is an attempt to sketch some possible elements, guidelines, and rec-
ommendations for reform in this highly difficult and complex area of the law. In
particular, an effort will be made to set forth some possible new approaches for tackling
these problems. It is hoped that such ideas and guidelines will serve as a blueprint and
impetus for prompt congressional and executive action.
B. Some Possible Elements, Guidelines, and Recommendations for Reform
I. Forums for Action
There seem to be strong arguments for the proposition that Congress is not the
appropriate forum for the initial development of an integrated model for reform in the
area of union organizational rights. The highly contentious nature of the debate con-
cerning this and other issues during the consideration of the Labor Law Reform Act of
1977-1978216 leads one to at least question whether the House and the Senate are indeed
the best forums for the reasoned preliminary formulation and development of models for
labor reform, particularly in an area as sensitive as that involving union organizational
rights. This concern is compounded by the fact, at times well illustrated during the
relevant 1977-1978 congressional labor reform floor debates, 217 that individual members
of Congress are generally not particularly well versed in the intricacies of labor law,
especially when it comes to an area as befuddling as that of union organizational rights. 218
Members are thus forced to rely on their staff members who also may not possess any
great range of expertise or experience in the field. 2"
Indeed, Congress did, at least in part, recognize its own possible shortcomings in
this regard when it attempted to mandate as part of the proposed 1977-1978 labor
214 See supra. notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
215 See generally supra notes 199-211 and accompanying text.
216
 See generally R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 202-04 (1984); F. TURNER,
THE LABOR LAW REFORM BILL, 1977.78: AN ANALYSIS OF ITS DEFEAT (1982); Mills, Flawed Victory
in Labor Law Reform, HARV. Bus. REV., May—June, 1979, at 92.
2 ' 7 See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. at 32,496 (misstatement, shortly later corrected, by then House
Labor Committee Chairman Frank Thompson regarding the applicability of the "24 hour" Peerless
Plywood rule).
212 Of course, on a rare occasion a member of Congress may formerly have worked for the
NLRB or otherwise practiced labor law. See, e.g., 123 CONG. Rec. at 32,487-88 (statements of
Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder regarding insights gained while working as an NLRB staff
member). Such instances, though, are quite expectedly relatively few and far between.
212 Congressional staff members are frequently young professionals ranging in age from about
twenty-five to forty. While such individuals may possess unusually strong innate abilities, their range





reform legislation that the NLRB develop "rules" regarding the specific details to be
encompassed in the proposed right of unions to "equal opportunity" organizational
access. 22° If enacted, this mandate would have been something of a milestone in the
analogs of the NLRB given the agency's oft-criticized general refusal to use its section
6221 rulemaking power in establishing new policy. 222
While it seems that Congress was on the right track in attempting to mandate the
use of a procedure which would afford broad open debate and input on this subject, it
appears somewhat less clear whether NLRB rulemaking of this kind would necessarily
be the best approach to the problem. First, it must be remembered that the NLRB has
always been and in the opinion of some has increasingly become, a "political" institu-
tion. 225 Even though the Administrative Procedure Act would require that no rules be
promulgated by the Board without the requisite opportunity for "notice and comment"
by all interested parties,224 the Board, a political entity, could still ultimately issue polit-
ically-oriented rules. Indeed, the fear of possible NLRB "politicization" of the rulemaking
process was expressed by some members of Congress during the 1977-1978 labor law
reform debate on this subject. 225
Beyond the issue of possible politicization of the process, however, there also seem
to be strong arguments for the development of general "rules" in this area in anticipation,
rather than as a result of, congressional action. More specifically, why not have a blue-
ribbon study commission, established along the lines of the Social Security Reform
Commission recently chaired by Dr. Alan Greenspan, 226 which would develop guidelines
for reform in this area for consideration by Congress? In the given context, the advan-
tages of such an approach seem considerable. In particular, the issues involved are so
controversial that it is perhaps only through a blue-ribbon study commission made up
of representatives from labor, business, Congress, and the executive branch, that any
sort of consensus can successfully be reached. 227 Furthermore, a study commission of
this kind would afford opportunities for the voicing and consideration of a wide range
of views, with such views being evaluated by individual commission members with the
technical expertise and ability to recognize the necessary and subtle interrelationships
which exist in this area of the law. 228 Most significantly, though, should a blue-ribbon
commission of this kind be able to achieve, through reasoned objective analysis, a con-
22" See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
221 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1982).
222 See, e.g., Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication—Rulemaking Dilemma Under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 581-93 (1970); Summers, Poltics, Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6
SYRACUSE L. REV. 93, 105-06 (1955).
229
	 generally Cook & Gautschi, Political Bias in NLRB Unfair Labor Practice Decisions, 35 INnus.
& LAB, REL. REV. 539 (1982); Dunau, The Role of Criticism in the Work of the National Labor Relations
Board, 16 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 205 (1963); 119 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 47 (May 20, 1985) (statement
of former NLRB Chairwoman Betty Southard Murphy); Meltzer, Is the NLRB a Closed Shop to Labor?,
Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1984, at 32, col. 3.
224 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(6)(2), (b)(3), (c) (1982).
225 See 123 CONG. REG. at 32,491 (statement of Congressman Ashbrook discussing political
impact of "liberal" NLRB on rulemaking).
226 See generally N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1981, at 16, col. 3.
227 Cf. Mills, supra note 216, at 101 (advocating a cooperative approach to problems in this
area).
"g See generally supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
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sensus model for reform, there would likely be considerable political impetus for both
Congress and the Executive Branch to take positive action with respect to it.
In sum, there seem to he strong arguments in favor of the establishment of some
sort of blue-ribbon panel to develop proposals for labor law reform, particularly with
respect to the area of rights of union organizational access. 229 Given the highly contro-
versial nature of the issues involved, such an approach seems far better than one which
relegates solely to Congress the initial development of an acceptable model for reform,
or one whereby Congress sets forth broad general guidelines and delegates formal
rulemaking to the NLRB. In this particular context, a nonpartisan blue-ribbon study
commission is probably the best potential forum for successful action.
2. The Need For "Bright Lines"
In developing guidelines for change in the area of union organizational rights, any
blue-ribbon panel considering possibilities for labor law reform should make a special
effort to set forth, to the extent possible, "bright line" recommendations, that is, clear
and precise doctrinal guidelines. Of course, the Supreme Court has stated that there are
no "mechanical answers" in this complex area of labor relations, 230 and there are consid-
erable arguments in favor of affording the NLRB broad discretion to proceed on a case-
by-case basis. 23 ' But, as Professor Bok has forcefully pointed out, there are perhaps even
stronger arguments in fiivor of the proposition that the legal rules in this area of labor
law have become far too obfuscated and unclear. 232 Thus, while there would obviously
be a degree of "arbitrariness" involved were a study commission to recommend, for
example, that all campaigning cease during the twenty-four hours before a labor elec-
tion,233
 a less clear-cut approach might, as Professor Bok has put it, ultimately "result in
much greater arbitrariness." 234
This is particularly true because, as various members of Congress noted during the
1977-1978 labor reform debate, 235 unclear rules and regulations tend to work their
greatest hardship on small employers and unions who simply can not afford "hot-shot"
labor lawyers. Indeed, such unions and employers may actually he forced to yield on a
given issue rather than face the prospect of absorbing the high costs of litigating it before
the Board and the federal courts. 236 Such an outcome does not seem to he a particularly
desirable or equitable one, and argues strongly for any study commission examining this
area to make recommendations that are, to the extent reasonably possible, straightfor-
ward and easily understandable to all interested parties. 237
229 Incidentally, the general concept of a nonpartisan study commission is not a completely
foreign one to the labor relations area. See, e.g., interim Report and Recommendations of the
Chairman's Task Force on the NLRB for 1976 (Betty Southard Murphy, Chairwoman).
2' 0 NLRB v. United Steelworkers (Nulone), 357 U.S. 357, 364 (1958).
23 ' See generally NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324 (1946).
sss Bok, supra note 107, at 102-03.
237 See generally Penn Comment, supra note 13, at 778-79 (making a suggestion along these
lines).
2" See Bok, supra now 107, at 102.
235 See, e.g., 123 Conk:. Rec. at 32,485 (statement of Mr. Erlenborn); id. at 32,486 (statement of
Mr. Ford). See generally Bok, supra note 107, at 58-59, 66.
23 ' See Bok, supra note 107, at 59.
227 Certainly it seems that any such study commission, despite the intervening self-interests of




3. The Home Visits Doctrine
In the context of the discussion above regarding the need for "bright line" standards,
the amendment to the "home visits doctrine" offered by. the late Congressman John
Ashbrook during the 1977-1978 congressional labor law reform debates 2" was arguably
an absolute abomination. The proposed amendment permitted employers to campaign
by visiting employees at their homes, but added the almost classically oxymoronic caveat
that the NLRB should, in this context, develop rules which protect the rights "of the
employees to enjoy the privacy of their home." 2" It is, of course, almost impossible to
conjecture what this caveat was meant to mean. Were unions and employers to have
been required to make appointments prior to calling on employees at their homes, 21 " to
visit employees only on weekdays before eight p.m., to knock only on the back door? As
Congressman George Miller of California insightfully pointed out during the House
debate on this issue, the proposed amendment offered almost limitless potential for
regulatory paperwork and con fusion. 24 '
A far better approach for a blue-ribbon commission studying this issue to take would •
be the recommendation that the "home visits doctrine" be abolished, and that neither
employers nor unions be allowed to campaign by visiting employees at their homes. For
one, an approach of this kind would have the obvious advantage of setting forth a "bright
line" regarding what interested parties can and can not do. Of course, essentially equally
"bright lines" could be established were a study commission merely to recommend that
the "home visits doctrine" be retained in its current form, that is, unions are permitted
to campaign by visiting employee homes while employers are not, or to propose that
employers be afforded the same rights in this regard as unions. Either of these latter
approaches, however, would have serious shortcomings.
First, as developed above,242 the "home visits doctrine" as presently constructed has
not been particularly effective in fulfilling its role as a means of providing unions with
organizational opportunities of the kind which successfully offset apparent employer
advantages. While it may be possible to make the doctrine in its present form more
effective,243 the price of such possible increased effectiveness may be rather high in terms
of heightened regulatory complexity and potential political controversy. 245 In addition,
explosion" which has considerably overburdened both administrative agencies and the federal
courts. See generally Bok, The Ballooning Wa,sle of Legal Hot Air: Are We Drowning In a Sea of Laws and
Legal Procedure?, Bus. & Soc. REV. Fall 1983, at 17-22. See also Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex
World, Wall St. J., June 27, 1985, at 28, col. 3.
2" See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
23"See 123 CONG. REC. at 32,989.
24"Such a requirement could significantly undercut the effectiveness of the technique. See supra
note 99 and accompanying text.
123 CONG. REC. at 32,492 (statement of Congressman George Miller).
242 See supra notes 71-111 and accompanying text.
245
	
example, unit size could be limited in certain demographic situations or in certain
industries, to facilitate the ability of unions to visit all employees at their homes. See generally supra
notes 103-12 and accompanying text.
244 Developing a myriad of different unit size limitations depending on demographic distribu-
tions, for example, would represent a considerable move away from "bright lines" standards. See
generally supra notes 230-37 and accompanying text.
245 Any change of rules in this area, particularly if one industry or another is going to be
singled out for better or worse treatment, is likely to engender considerable political controversy.
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retention of the status quo ante would still leave irksome "imbalance" problems, such as
those presented in special situations like Daniel Construction, 246 to be reckoned with.
On the other hand, adoption of legislation permitting employers to make home
visits would appear to be even more foolhardy. There are strong arguments in favor of
the proposition that employers already enjoy a marked organizational access advantage
over unions. 247 Indeed, the "home visits doctrine" as currently formulated represents an
administrative attempt to offset alleged employer advantages in this regard. 248 Thus, it
would seem rather nonsensical to further increase employer advantages in this area.249
This is particularly true given the fact that such an approach would entail an even
greater incursion on employee rights of privacy than currently exists.
In sum, very strong arguments exist that support a study commission's recommen-
dations in favor of abolishing the "home visits doctrine" and prohibiting both unions and
employers from visiting employees at their homes during labor election campaigns. Such
an approach would have the advantage of setting forth a clear standard, but more
significantly would represent a significant step forward toward better protection of
individual employee privacy rights. 250 The one obvious and key drawback of such an
approach, though, is that it would put unions at an even greater organizational access
disadvantage than they currently are. The general benefits to be derived from taking
such a tack, however, would in all probability outweigh the harm in this regard. This is
particularly true since the incorporation of various of the suggestions set forth below
into an overall model for reform, would more than offset any diminution in organiza-
tional abilities unions suffer as a result of the lost ability to campaign by visiting employees
at their homes.
4. Extending Excelsior
In the context of the potential abolition of the "home visits doctrine," the arguments
in favor of extending the Board's Excelsior doctrine appear to be considerable. Without
the ability to campaign by visiting employees at their homes, unions will need to make
greater use of alternative organizational techniques. A number of such techniques,
including mailing letters to employee homes, placing targeted advertising in local me-
dia,25 ' and perhaps even making telephone calls to employee homes, 259 would all be
246 See .supra notes 149-58 and accompanying text.
247
	 supra notes 117-48 and accompanying text.
2"a
	 supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
2"2 This would seem to be true even if, as in the case of the 1977-1978 labor reform proposals,
such a provision was part of a package giving unions increased organizational opportunities. A
formula could be worked out increasing union opportunities to the point where they roughly equal
those of employers, without "upping the ante" and still further increasing employer opportunities
— particularly where such "upped ante" would significantly invade employee privacy rights.
2" See supra notes 159-80 and accompanying text.
25
 Advertising on local radio stations and in local newspapers (particularly those of the "shop-
per" variety) can often be rather inexpensive. With improvements in technology being achieved on
an ongoing basis, new forms of communication will be constantly evolving. See generally The
Changing Situation of Workers and Their Unions, A Report by the AFL-CIO Committee on the
Evolution of Work, at 20,27 (1985).
252 It seems unlikely that telephone calls to the home would be banned under a ban on "home
visits" since such telephone calls do not represent the same level of intrusion on employee privacy
rights as do home visits. Nevertheless, this is an issue worthy of further consideration.
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meaningfully facilitated were the scope of the Excelsior doctrine extended and unions
able to obtain employee name and address lists at an earlier stage in the organizational
process. 253 Given such a construct, it seems that providing unions with earlier access to
such lists would make considerable sense. This is particularly true since concerns of the
kind raised by employers during the Excelsior litigation regarding the fact that union use
of such lists might lead to undue invasions of employee privacy rights 254 would now in
large part be obviated given the home visits doctrine's abolition.
The primary problems in extending the scope of the Excelsior doctrine and releasing
employee names and addresses to unions at an earlier stage in the organizational process,
however, are likely to be logistical ones. There are, however, various viable options for
a study commission to consider in examining this issue.
One possibility, for example, might be to adopt a ten percent authorization card
benchmark, whereby unions possessing "authorization cards" signed by ten percent of
the employees in the given unit and stating that said employees wished to be represented
by that union, could be entitled to a comprehensive list of all unit employee names and
addresses. Such a standard would be considerably lower than the thirty percent card
showing presently required to schedule a representation election 255 and trigger Excelsior
rights, but likely high enough to discourage frivolous use of the process. 2513 Further, the
ten percent authorization card standard has been used by the NLRB as a benchmark in
other contexts. 237
Another possibility, at least as far as union home mailings are concerned, might be
to mandate that employers address and mail to employees' homes any letters or literature
that given unions wish to send, as long as the unions are willing to pay for the mailings. 258
Similar requirements currently exist pursuant to the Landrum Griffin Act259 in internal
union elections. This right might be one unions would be able to assert at anytime during
their organizational efforts, that is, no ten percent or other showing of interest would
have to be established for such mailings to be sent as long as the unions were willing to
bear the mailing costs. 2" Or, perhaps, a rule might be developed whereby unions would
be able to assert this right before they obtained a ten percent showing of interest, but if
259
	 generally K. GAGALA, supra note 83, at 167-76 (discussing these organizational techniques);
Gould, Recent Developments, supra note 84, at 507 n.35.
2" See Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1243-44 (1966).
255 Of course, since the Supreme Court's holding in Linden Lumber, an employer can insist on
the holding of a secret ballot election regardless of the percentage of signed authorization cards a
union possesses.
256 For example, once a petitioning union has made a thirty percent showing of interest and
an election is scheduled, other unions, known as "intervenors," can frequently win a place on the
ballot with a showing of only one authorization card. See, e.g., Manhattan College, 195 N.L.R.B. 65
(1975). Where such a standard applied for the triggering of name and address rights, it might
possibly encourage frivolous use of the system, for example, a union obtaining one signed card in
order to obtain a list of employee names and addresses to be used or sold for other purposes.
257 The Board, for example, permits intervening unions who have demonstrated a ten percent
showing of interest to block election-scheduling "consent agreements" between employers and
petitioning unions. Unions with lesser showings cannot block such election scheduling. See NLRB,
AN OUTLINE OF LAW AND PROCEDURE. IN REPRESENTATION CASES § 11022.3(c)—(d) (1974).
259 See generally Bok, supra note 107, at 100.
256 29 U.S.C. § 418(c) (1982).
260 Such "mailing costs" would probably have to include the cost of postage plus some charge
for overhead expenses.
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such an assertion were made the threshold for later obtaining a comprehensive listing
of employee names and addresses might rise to perhaps a fifteen percent authorization
card level.
In any event, the above suggestions are by all means meant to be of a very tentative
and preliminary nature. A study commission examining this issue would have consid-
erable leeway in formulating the most auspicious approach. Nevertheless, it seems clear
that providing unions with earlier access to employee name and address lists would be
one relatively painless and uncontroversia1 26 ' way to offset lost union organizational
opportunities engendered by the proposed abolition of the "home visits doctrine," and
to better balance union/management rights in this regard.
5. Strengthening Unfair Practice Remedies
Another way for unions to have stronger organizational abilities even absent the
right to make home visits, would be for action to be taken significantly bolstering the
NLRA's unfair practice remedy provisions. It must, in this regard, be remembered that
under the Supreme Court's decision in the Republic Aviation case, employees at a work-
place do have considerable rights in terms of engaging in union organizational solicitation
during nonworking time and in nonworking areas.262 Indeed, these rights of employee
solicitation have received strong, recent reaffirmation by the Supreme Court in NLRB
v. Magnavox C0. 263 and Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB.26• While outside professional organizers may
generally be somewhat more capable of conveying to workers the union's appeal, the
organizational abilities of in-plant employees should not be underestimated, particularly
since it is not completely unknown for unions anticipating a major organization to have
experienced organizers attempt to "hire into" the targeted workplace. 265
In-plant employee organizers, however, as Professor Daniel Pollitt has recently
pointed out,266 do frequently face one tremendous obstacle — "fear of employer retal-
iation." Despite the fact that section 8(a)(3) 267 clearly makes it an unfair labor practice
violation of the Act for employers to discharge or otherwise discriminate against em-
ployees for union organizational activity, the number of employees being discharged in
flagrant disregard of this provision has skyrocketed in recent years. Indeed, while the
overall number of labor representation elections being held has remained relatively
stable over the years, the number of workers being reinstated to their jobs by the NLRB
because they were "discriminatorily discharged" has soared from a low of 922 employees
in 1957 to over 10,000 employees in 1980. 268 In addition, thousands of other meritorious
charges are being brought each year by employees who are able to prove that employers
261
 Employers have no highly significant "property" interest in such lists, and if a proposal of
this kind were part of a broader consensus study commission package of reform, little objection
would probably he engendered.
262 See supra notes 15- 19 and accompanying text.
263
 415 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1974) (holding that employee solicitation rights cannot be waived in
a collective bargaining agreement).
264
 437 U.S. 556, 574-75 (1978) (broadly construing what type of literature is protected by the
"mutual aid or protection clause" of NLRA).
265 See K. GAGAI.A, supra note 83, at 149-53.
266 See Statement of Professor Daniel H. Pollitt, before House Labor Subcommittee on Labor—
Management Relations, 118 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA), at F-6 (June 22, 1984).
261 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
268 See Weiler, supra note 82, at 1780.
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have discriminated against them because of union activity in ways falling short of dis-
charge. 269
Employer incentives in this regard are obvious. Union supporters who are dismissed
become immediately ineligible to vote, a fact which in and of itself might tip a close
election. 270 Moreover, the discharge of union adherents will in all probability give, as
Professor Paul Weiler has put it, "a chilling edge to the warning that union representation
is likely to be more trouble for the employees than it is worth.""' This is particularly
true given the fact that it may take years for a discriminatorily discharged employee to
get his job back, 272 and that what the employer then pays is the employee's back pay
(plus interest) minus what he or she has earned, or in the judgment of the NLRB should
have earned in the interim period. 2" The average unfair practice backpay award under
the Act is currently about two thousand dollars."'
A study commission concerned enough with the importance of protecting individual
employee rights to consider the abolition of the "home visits doctrine" should also be
concerned enough about such rights to closely consider strengthened remedies for illegal
employee discharges and other discrimination at the workplace. The Labor Reform Act
of 1977-1978 offered two specific possibilities in this regard, namely, the greater use of
preliminary injunctions under section 10(1) 275 in discriminatory discharge cases, 2 '6 and
the awarding of something more than simple mitigated back pay plus interest to employees
found to have been illegally fired for union activity. 277 Both of these proposals stirred
considerable controversy 278 and have considerable potential drawbacks. 279 Nevertheless,
they and other possible solutions 28° to this difficult problem seem worthy of careful,
closer examination.
"9 Id. at 1780-81.
2" Id. at 1778.
271 1d.
272 It may take up to as many as three years or so for an employee to ultimately be reinstated
to his job by the Board and the courts. Id. at 1796-97.
2" See 1I.R. REP. No. 637, .supra note 181, at 7; S. REP. No. 628, supra note 184, at 13.
274 See Weiler, supra note 82, at 1780.
275 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1982).
278 See H.R. REP. No. 637, supra note 181, at 7, 30; S. REP. No. 628, supra note 184, at 11-13.
277 House version of the reform bill would have awarded double back pay plus interest
while the Senate bill would have granted only one and one-half times back pay plus interest. In
addition, the House bill would have permitted no mitigation of damages, while the Senate bill
would have permitted mitigation but only for wages actually earned.
278 See, e.g., Nash, supra note 118, at 66-72; Labor Reform Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 1883 Before
the Subcomm, on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 650-51 (1977)
(statement of Charles G, Bakaly) (hereinafter cited as Bakal)! Statementb
270
	
provisions, for example, might create strong pressures on employers to litigate rather
than settle given charges. See Bakaly Statement, supra note 278, at 651; Nash, supra note 118, at 67,
71. See generally Nolan & Lehr, Improving NLRB Unfair Labor Practice Procedures, 57 Tex. L. REv.
47, 58-60 (1978); Weiler, supra note 82, at 1803. Moreover, the increased back-pay proposal, in
particular, might cast the Act in an improperly punitive, as opposed to remedial, mode. See generally
Nash, supra note 118, at 67 (discussing the possible punitive aspects of this provision especially on
small business persons). Cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 11-12 (1940) (expressing
the view that the relief provisions of the NLRA are designed to be "remedial" and not "punitive").
280 One possibility, fur example, might be the incorporation into the NLRA of the Japanese
doctrine of "kinkyu meirei," under which employees can be afforded back pay and other relief
pending judicial review of their charges. See Gould, Labor Law in Japan and the United States: A
32	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 27: I
One leading observer of the American labor scene recently stated that "defiance of
section 8(a)(3) has become almost a way of life for nonunion American employers." 2"
To the extent this situation can be reversed, and employees can become freely able to
exercise their section 7282 rights and talk to other employees at the workplace about
unionization, union organizational abilities will receive a "shot in the arm" of far greater
consequence than the loss of the ability to visit employees at their homes. The issue is
one of highest priority.
6. Off-Duty Employees
It may further be possible to extend union organizational abilities by means of
clarifying and expanding the scope of organizational access afforded to off-duty em-
ployees. In the 1973 case of GTE Lenkhurt, Inc."3 the NLRB likened the status of off-
duty employees to that of "trespassing" nonemployees, and held that off-duty employees
would thus he subject to the same restrictions on workplace organizing as are nonem-
p ioyees.284
Three years later, however, the Board shifted its position on this issue in the case
of Tri- County Medical Center. 285 In Tri-County, the NLRB held that off-duty employees
were to be given significantly greater rights of organizational access than nonemployees,
specifically stating that off-duty employees can engage in union organizational activity
so long as such activity is conducted outside "the interior of the plant and other working
areas."286 Thus, under Tri- County, employer rules prohibiting off-duty employee access
to outside areas such as plant parking lots and gates are presumptively invalid absent
strong business justifications. 287 Nevertheless, since its Tri - County decision, the Board has
at times cited GTE Leukhurt as the primary precedent governing this area, 288 and there
appears to be sonic ongoing confusion regarding the applicable standards pertaining to
this subject. 289 Moreover, while the Board's decision in Tri-County seems to rest on far
better legal and practical grounds than its one in GTE Lenkhurt, the distinctions the Tri-
County holding makes between interior versus exterior off-duty employee workplace
access seem to be rather artificial ones, as one commentator has insightfully noted. 29°
More specifically, if the concern regarding off-duty employee organizational access
is one based on protection of employer property rights — the theory set forth in Babcock
as the justification for keeping nonemployee organizers off employer premises291 — then
off-duty employees should simply be treated like nonemployees and barred from the
Comparative Perspective, 6 'Nuns. REL. L.J, 1, 57-59 (1984). See also W. Goutio, JAPAN'S RESHAPING
OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 84-89 (1984).
2" Weiler, supra note 82, at 1803 n.130.
282 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
282
	 N.L.R.B. 921 (1973).
284 Id. at 921.
289 222 N.L.R.B. 1089 (1976).
2" Id. at 1089.
"7 Id.
288 See, e.g., Pioneer Fishing Corp., 247 N.L.R.B. 1299, 1303 (1980).
289 See Texas Note, supra note 21, at 142.
299 See Yale Note, supra note 22, at 380 n.40.
29]
 See generally supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
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work premises. To this extent, the Board's decision in GTE Lenkhurt, while perhaps
"legally and practically unsound," 292 at least rests on a solid theoretical foundation.
On the other hand, if it is essentially managerial interests which are being protected,
then it makes little sense to differentiate the situation of the off-duty employee from
that of the on-duty employee who is permitted to engage in union organizing activity
but only in nonworking areas during nonworking time. Under Tr-á -County, however,
specious managerial-type interests are advanced to prohibit individuals who have already
been admitted onto the property from talking to workers in contexts which would seem
to represent little real threat to managerial integrity. 293
A study commission examining this issue would thus likely be taking a positive step
forward in recommending that off-duty employees be afforded the same organizational
rights as on-duty employees, particularly if overall union organizational abilities are
going to be cut back via the abolition of the "home visits doctrine." Such an approach
would entail relatively minimal encroachment on employer property or managerial
interest, while providing off-duty employees the chance to meet with fellow workers in
cafeterias, rest areas, and other workplace locations which are amenable to free discussion
regarding the opportunities posed by self-organization. 29.' In sum, expansion of the
organizational rights of off-duty employees appears to he a reform highly worthy of
careful further examination.
7. "Captive Audiences" and Election Debates
Over the years the NLRB has recognized the special potency of employer anti-union
"captive audience" speeches delivered to employees during paid working time by regu-
lating said speeches in a variety of manners."' At the present time, however, employers
generally have broad license to deliver such speeches without restriction, 296 a fact which
arguably gives them a significant organizational access advantage over unions. 297 The
Labor Reform Act of 1977-1978 would have legislatively implemented an approach,
formerly administratively tested by the NLRB for a short while in the I 950s, 298 of giving
unions an in-plant "right of reply" to these speeches. 299 The logistical problems involved
in establishing such a union "right of reply" are considerable, however,"'" and there
seems to be some merit to exploring other possible ways of dealing with this somewhat
intractable problem.
292 See Comment, Right of Off-Duty Employees to Enter and Remain on Employer Premises for Orga-
nizational Purposes, 54 B.U.L. REV. 199, 201 (1974).
293 See Yale Note, supra note 22, at 380 n.40.
294
	
gates, in contrast, while amenable to literature distribution, are not exactly the best
places for relaxed discussions regarding the advantages of unionization. See id. See also Klare, The
Public,Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358, 1370 (1982) (workplace as a natural
forum for communication of this kind).
295 See Penn Comment, supra note 13, at 779-80.
29' The only major restriction on such speeches at the present time is that they cannot be given
during the 24 hours prior to the election. See Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429-30
(1953).
2 '" See generally supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text. This advantage, as Professor Bok
has pointed out, can be as much psychological as practical. See Bok, supra note 107, at 101 n.174.
29" See Bonwit Teller, inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951).
'"9 See 123 CONG. REC. at '32,483-86 (statements of Congressmen Thompson, Ford and Glick-
man).
31" See Penn Comment, supra note 13, at 782-84.
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In this regard, one idea at least worthy of further consideration is the possible
institution of NLRB sponsored union/management election debates."' While, of course,
the general notion of promoting "free debate on issues dividing labor and
management" 302 has long been a central one under the NLRA, this concept has never
been operationalized by the actual scheduling of NLRB sponsored give-and-take election
debates.
The debates approach could be integrated into the current regulatory framework
in a variety of fashions. One possibility, for example, might be for Congress to mandate
that a set number of such debates be held on working premises during working time"
as part of any given representation election campaign. Such debates would replace the
right of employers to deliver "captive audience" speeches, as well as the argued-for right
of unions to reply to such deliverances." Hopefully, the give and take of debates of this
kind would better serve to inform and educate the electorate than the combination of
an employer "captive audience" speech and a possible union reply."
On the other hand, Board debates could potentially be structured as simply an
additional campaign option open to the parties at their discretion."' Alternatively, a far
broader "remedial" type structure could be used, with any employer deliverance of even
one "captive audience" speech triggering a minimum of three Board sponsored work-
time election debates. In any event, consistent with Professor Boles suggestion," this
may be a particularly appropriate area in which to experiment with special rules for
larger election units, given the particular difficulties unions face in getting their story
across in such situations." Special rules might also be instituted outlawing "captive
audience" speeches and/or debates during the final three to seven days of the election
campaign," again along the lines of recommendations made by Professor Bok. 310
In any event, the ideas sketched above are, once again, only meant to be preliminary
in nature. Nevertheless, the general concept of having NLRB sponsored representation
election debates appears to be a very appealing one. Even a study commission comprised
of leading experts, though, will have its hands full in fleshing out the precise contours
of such an approach.
V. CONCLUSION
Since the 1950s Supreme Court decisions in Babcock and Nutone holding that em-
ployers have broad rights to campaign at the workplace while simultaneously excluding
nonemployee union organizers from doing so, unions have been at an arguable orga-
301 The author is initially indebted to Professor Howard Lesnick for this idea.
"See Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 62 (1966).
" The precise logistics of compensating workers during this time would, of course, have to be
worked out.
"4 See generally Penn Comment, supra note 13, at 785.
"5 See id,
3"' See id.
407 See Bok, supra note 107, at 101-02. See generally supra notes 103-11 and accompanying text.
", See Bok, supra note 107, at 101-02. Congress or the Board, for example, might mandate
the holding of more debates in units larger than 75 or 100 workers.
309 Of course, "captive audience" speeches, are currently prohibited during the final 24 hours
before an election. Nevertheless, there may be strong arguments for a broader ban on "last minute"
campaigning, which is extremely difficult to rebut or counter.
410 See id. at 100-03.
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nizational access disadvantage. In 1966, this fact was explicitly recognized by the NLRB
in its companion holdings in the Excelsior and General Electric cases, where the Board
decided to afford unions petitioning for an election the right to a list of employee names
and addresses. A primary rationale for providing unions with such lists was the hope
that they would be able to successfully use them in making campaign visits to employee
homes. In addition, since the right to campaign by means of employee home visitations
was not one lawfully afforded employers, it was further hoped that unions' advantage
in this regard would work to offset employer organizational advantages of other kinds,
and create a balanced union/management organizational climate.
The "home visits doctrine," however, has not fulfilled its promise. Due to a variety
of demographic and other factors, it has not been an effective counterbalance to the
organizational advantages employers enjoy by way of their almost overwhelming ability
to reach employees at the workplace. Moreover, even if the "home visits doctrine" was
effective as a balancer of organizational rights, it is highly questionable whether the
benefits derived in this regard outweigh the costs imposed on individual employees in
terms of diminished rights of privacy.
Consequently, this article has recommended that the "home visits doctrine" be
abolished, and that neither employers nor unions be permitted to make campaign visits
of this kind. To compensate unions for the loss of this access to employees, however,
and to help better meaningfully structure and balance union versus management orga-
nizational rights and privileges, this article has set forth a number of proposals for study
commission examination. These proposals, drawn in part from Congress' 1977-1978
labor law reform debates, include: (I) the extension of the Excelsior doctrine, (2) the
strengthening of unfair labor practice remedies, (3) the broadening of the organizational
rights of off-duty employees, and (4) the establishment of NLRB sponsored labor election
debates. It is hoped that these proposals will help serve as catalysts for change in an area
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